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Pursuant to Rule 24(j) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, Defendant/Appellant Carlos R. Sampson cites the 
following supplemental authority, Minnick v. Mississippi, Case 
No. 89-6332, U.S. (December 3, 1990), also found at 
199 0 West Law 186059 (courtesy copy attached), in support of his 
argument that his fifth amendment rights were violated by the 
procedures utilized by the police in his case. Specifically, 
Mr. Sampson draws the Court's attention to page 4 of the West Law 
opinion where the United States Supreme Court cites without 
distinction to Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91 (1984), previously 
relied on in his briefs to this Court. 
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CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI 
Syllabus 
Petitioner Minnick was arrested on a Mississippi warrant for capital murder. 
An interrogation by federal law enforcement officials ended when he requested a 
lawyer, and he subsequently communicated with appointed counsel two or three 
times. Interrogation was reinitiatedby a county deputy sheriff after Minnick 
was told that he could not refuse to talk to him, and Minnick confessed. The 
motion to suppress the confession was denied, and he was convicted and 
sentenced to death. The State Supreme Court rejected his argument that the 
confession was taken in violation of, inter alia, his Fifth Amendment right to 
counsel, reasoning that the rule of Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U. S. 477 that once 
an accused requests counsel, officials may not reinitiate questioning "until 
counsel has been made available" to him did not apply, since counsel had been 
made available. 
Held: When counsel is requested, interrogation must cease, and officials may 
not reinitiate interrogation without counsel present, whether or not the 
accused has consulted with his attorney. In context, the requirement that 
counsel be "made available" to the accused refers not to the opportunity to 
consult with an attorney outside the interrogation room, but to the right to 
have the attorney present during custodial interrogation. This rule is 
appropriate and necessary, since a single consultation with an attorney does 
not remove the suspect from persistent attempts by officials to persuade him to 
waive his rights and from the coercive pressures that accompany custody and may 
increase as it is prolonged. The proposed exception is inconsistent with 
Edwards' purpose to protect a suspect's right to have counsel present at 
custodial interrogation and with Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, where the 
theory that the opportunity to consult with one's attorney would substantially 
counteract the compulsion created by custodial interrogation was specifically 
rejected. It also would undermine the advantages flowing from Edwards' clear 
and unequivocal character. Since, under respondent's formulation of the rule, 
Edwards' protection could be reinstated by a subsequent request for counsel, it 
could pass in and out of existence multiple times, a vagary that would spread 
confusion through the justice system and lead to a loss of respect for the 
underlying constitutional principle. And such an exception would leave 
uncertain the sort of consultation required to displace Edwards. In addition, 
allowing a suspect whose counsel is prompt to lose Edwards' protection while 
one whose counsel is dilatory would not would distort the proper conception of 
an attorney's duty to his client and set a course at odds with what ought to be 
effective representation. Since Minnick/s interrogation was initiated by the 
police in a formal interview which he was compelled to attend, after Minnick 
had previously made a specific request for counsel, it was impermissible. Pp. 
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551 So. 2d 77, reversed and remanded. 
KENNEDY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which WHITE, MARSHALL, 
BLACKMUN, STEVENS, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. SCALIA, J., filed a dissenting 
opinion, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., joined. SOUTER, J., took no part in the 
consideration or decision of the case. 
JUSTICE KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court. 
To protect the privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth 
Amendment, we have held that the police must terminate interrogation of an 
accused in custody if the accused requests the assistance of counsel. Miranda 
v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 474 (1966). We reinforced the protections of 
Miranda in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U. S. 477, 484-485 (1981), which held that 
once the accused requests counsel, officials may not reinitiate questioning 
"until counsel has been made available" to him. The issue in the case before 
us is whether Edwards' protection ceases once the suspect has consulted with an 
attorney. 
Petitioner Robert Minnick and fellow prisoner James Dyess escaped from a 
county jail in Mississippi and, a day later, broke into a mobile home in search 
of weapons. In the course of the burglary they were interrupted by the arrival 
of the trailer's owner, Ellis Thomas, accompanied by Lamar Lafferty and 
Lafferty's infant son. Dyess and Minnick used the stolen weapons to kill 
Thomas and the senior Lafferty. Minnickfs story is that Dyess murdered one 
victim and forced Minnick to shoot the other. Before the escapees could get 
away, two young women arrived at the mobile home. They were held at gunpoint, 
then bound hand and foot. Dyess and Minnick fled in Thomas' truck, abandoning 
the vehicle in New Orleans. The fugitives continued to Mexico, where they 
fought, and Minnick then proceeded alone to California. Minnick was arrested 
in Lemon Grove, California, on a Mississippi warrant, some four months after 
the murders. 
The confession at issue here resulted from the last interrogation of Minnick 
while he was held in the San Diego jail, but we first recount the events which 
preceded it. Minnick was arrested on Friday, August 22, 1986. Petitioner 
testified that he was mistreated by local police during and after the arrest. 
The day following the arrest, Saturday, two FBI agents came to the jail to 
interview him. Petitioner testified that he refused to go to the interview, 
but was told he would "have to go down or else." App. 45. The FBI report 
indicates that the agents read petitioner his Miranda warnings, and that he 
acknowledged he understood his rights. He refused to sign a rights waiver 
form, however, and said he would not answer "very many" questions. Minnick 
told the agents about the jail break and the flight, and described how Dyess 
threatened and beat him. Early in the interview, he sobbed "[i]t was my life 
or theirs," but otherwise he hesitated to tell what happened at the trailer. 
The agents reminded him he did not have to answer questions without a lawyer 
present. According to the report, "Minnick stated 'Come back Monday when I 
have a lawyer,' and stated that he would make a more complete statement then 
with his lawyer present." App. 16. The FBI interview ended. 
After the FBI interview, an appointed attorney met with petitioner. 
Petitioner spoke with the lawyer on two or three occasions, though it is not 
COPR. (C) WEST 1990 NO CLAIM TO ORIG. U.S. GOVT. WORKS 
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clear from the record whether all of these conferences were in person. 
On Monday, August 25, Deputy Sheriff J. C. Denham of Clarke County, 
Mississippi, came to the San Diego jail to question Minnick. Minnick testified 
that his jailers again told him he would flhave to talk" to Denham and that he 
"could not refuse." Id., at 45. Denham advised petitioner of his rights, and 
petitioner again declined to sign a rights waiver form. Petitioner told Denham 
about the escape and then proceeded to describe the events at the mobile home. 
According to petitioner, Dyess jumped out of the mobile home and shot the first 
of the two victims, once in the back with a shotgun and once in the head with a 
pistol. Dyess then handed the pistol to petitioner and ordered him to shoot 
the other victim, holding the shotgun on petitioner until he did so. 
Petitioner also said that when the two girls arrived, he talked Dyess out of 
raping or otherwise hurting them. 
Minnick was tried for murder in Mississippi. He moved to suppress all 
statements given to the FBI or other police officers, including Denham. The 
trial court denied the motion with respect to petitioner's statements to 
Denham, but suppressed his other statements. Petitioner was convicted on two 
counts of capital murder and sentenced to death. 
On appeal, petitioner argued that the confession to Denham was taken in 
violation of his rights to counsel under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. The 
Mississippi Supreme Court rejected the claims. With respect to the Fifth 
Amendment aspect of the case, the court found "the Edwards bright line rule as 
to initiation" inapplicable. 551 So. 2d 77, 83 (1988). Relying on language in 
Edwards indicating that the bar on interrogating the accused after a request 
for counsel applies " 'until counsel has been made available to him,' 
' ' ibid., quoting Edwards v. Arizona, supra, at 484-485, the court concluded 
that "[s]ince counsel was made available to Minnick# his Fifth Amendment right 
to counsel was satisfied." 551 So. 2d, at 83. The court also rejected the 
Sixth Amendment claim, finding that petitioner waived his Sixth Amendment right 
to counsel when he spoke with Denham. Id., at 83-85. We granted certiorari, 
495 U. S. (1990), and, without reaching any Sixth Amendment implications in 
the case, we decide that the Fifth Amendment protection of Edwards is not 
terminated or suspended by consultation with counsel. 
In Miranda v. Arizona, supra, at 474, we indicated that once an individual in 
.custody invokes his right to counsel, interrogation "must cease until an 
attorney is present" ; at that point, "the individual must have an opportunity 
to confer with the attorney and to have him present during any subsequent 
questioning." Edwards gave force to these admonitions, finding it 
"inconsistent with Miranda and its progeny for the authorities, at their 
instance, to reinterrogate an accused in custody if he has clearly asserted his 
right to counsel." 451 U. S., at 485. We held that "when an accused has 
invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a 
valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he 
responded to further police initiated custodial interrogation even if he has 
been advised of his rights." Id., at 484. Further, an accused who requests 
an attorney, "having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through 
counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until 
counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates 
further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police." Id., at 
484-485. 
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Edwards is "designed to prevent police from badgering a defendant into waiving 
his previously asserted Miranda rights." Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U. 
S. , (1990). See also Smith v. Illinois, 469 U. S. 91, 98 (1984). The 
rule ensures that any statement made in subsequent interrogation is not the 
result of coercive pressures. Edwards conserves judicial resources which would 
otherwise be expended in making difficult determinations of voluntariness, and 
implements the protections of Miranda in practical and straightforward terms. 
The merit of the Edwards decision lies in the clarity of its command and the 
certainty of its application. We have confirmed that the Edwards rule 
provides " 'clear and unequivocal' guidelines to the law enforcement 
profession." Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U. S. 675, 682 (1988). Cf. Moran v. 
Burbine, 475 U. S. 412, 425-426 (1986). Even before Edwards, we noted that 
Miranda's "relatively rigid requirement that interrogation must cease upon the 
accused's request for an attorney ... has the virtue of informing police and 
prosecutors with specificity as to what they may do in conducting custodial 
interrogation, and of informing courts under what circumstances statements 
obtained during such interrogation are not admissible. This gain in 
specificity, which benefits the accused and the State alike, has been thought 
to outweigh the burdens that the decision in Miranda imposes on law enforcement 
agencies and the courts by requiring the suppression of trustworthy and highly 
probative evidence even though the confession might be voluntary under 
traditional Fifth Amendment analysis." Fare v. Michael C , 442 U. S. 707, 
718 (1979). This pre-Edwards explanation applies as well to Edwards and its 
progeny. Arizona v. Roberson, supra, at 681-682. 
The Mississippi Supreme Court relied on our statement in Edwards that an 
accused who invokes his right to counsel "is not subject to further 
interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to 
him.*.." 451 U. S., at 484-485. We do not interpret this language to mean, 
as the Mississippi court thought, that the protection of Edwards terminates 
once counsel has consulted with the suspect. In context, the requirement that 
counsel be "made available" to the accused refers to more than an opportunity 
to consult with an attorney outside the interrogation room. 
In Edwards, we focused on Miranda's instruction that when the accused invokes 
his right to counsel, "the interrogation must cease until an attorney is 
present," 384 U. S., at 474 (emphasis added), agreeing with Edwards' 
contention that he had not waived his right "to have counsel present during 
custodial interrogation." 451 U. S., at 482 (emphasis added). In the 
sentence preceding the language quoted by the Mississippi Supreme Court, we 
referred to the "right to have counsel present during custodial 
interrogation," and in the sentence following, we again quoted the phrase 
M
 'interrogation must cease until an attorney is present' ' ' from Miranda. 
451 U. S., at 484-485 (emphasis added). The full sentence relied on by the 
Mississippi Supreme Court, moreover, says: "We further hold that an accused, 
such as Edwards, having expressed his desire to deal with the police only 
through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities 
until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself 
initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the 
police." Ibid, (emphasis added). 
Our emphasis on counsel's presence at interrogation is not unique to Edwards. 
It derives from Miranda, where we said that in the cases before us "[t]he 
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presence of counsel .•. would be the adequate protective device necessary to 
make the process of police interrogation conform to the dictates of the [Fifth 
Amendment] privilege. His presence would insure that statements made in the 
government established atmosphere are not the product of compulsion." 384 U. 
S., at 466. See Fare v. Michael C , supra, at 719. Our cases following 
Edwards have interpreted the decision to mean that the authorities may not 
initiate questioning of the accused in counsel's absence. Writing for a 
plurality of the Court, for instance, then JUSTICE REHNQUIST described the 
holding of Edwards to be "that subsequent incriminating statements made 
without [Edwards'] attorney present violated the rights secured to the 
defendant by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution." Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U. S. 1039, 1043 (1983) (emphasis 
added). See also Arizona v. Roberson, supra, at 680 ("The rule of the Edwards 
case came as a corollary to Miranda's admonition that '[i]f the individual 
states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an 
attorney is present' ' ') ; Shea v. Louisiana, 470 U. S. 51, 52 (1985) ("In 
Edwards v. Arizona, ... this Court ruled that a criminal defendant's rights 
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments were violated by the use of his 
confession obtained by police instigated interrogation without counsel present 
after he requested an attorney" ). These descriptions of Edwards' holding are 
consistent with our statement that " [p]reserving the integrity of an accused's 
choice to communicate with police only through counsel is the essence of 
Edwards and its progeny." Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U. S. 285, 291 (1988). 
In our view, a fair reading of Edwards and subsequent cases demonstrates that 
we have interpreted the rule to bar police initiated interrogation unless the 
accused has counsel with him at the time of questioning. Whatever the 
ambiguities of our earlier cases on this point, we now hold that when counsel 
is requested, interrogation must cease, and officials may not reinitiate 
interrogation without counsel present, whether or not the accused has consulted 
with his attorney. 
We consider our ruling to be an appropriate and necessary application of the 
Edwards rule. A single consultation with an attorney does not remove the 
suspect from persistent attempts by officials to persuade him to waive his 
rights, or from the coercive pressures that accompany custody and that may 
increase as custody is prolonged. The case before us well illustrates the 
pressures, and abuses, that may be concomitants of custody. Petitioner 
testified that though he resisted, he was required to submit to both the FBI 
and the Denham interviews. In the latter instance, the compulsion to submit to 
interrogation followed petitioner's unequivocal request during the FBI 
interview that questioning cease until counsel was present. The case 
illustrates also that consultation is not always effective in instructing the 
suspect of his rights. One plausible interpretation of the record is that 
petitioner thought he could keep his admissions out of evidence by refusing to 
sign a formal waiver of rights. If the authorities had complied with Minnick's 
request to have counsel present during interrogation, the attorney could have 
corrected Minnick's misunderstanding, or indeed counseled him that he need not 
make a statement at all. We decline to remove protection from police initiated 
questioning based on isolated consultations with counsel who is absent when the 
interrogation resumes. 
The exception to Edwards here proposed is inconsistent with Edwards' purpose 
COPR. (C) WEST 1990 NO CLAIM TO ORIG. U.S. GOVT. WORKS 
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to protect the suspect's right to have counsel present at custodial 
interrogation. It is inconsistent as well with Miranda, where we specifically 
rejected respondent's theory that the opportunity to consult with one's 
attorney would substantially counteract the compulsion created by custodial 
interrogation. We noted in Miranda that "[e]ven preliminary advice given to 
the accused by his own attorney can be swiftly overcome by the secret 
interrogation process. Thus the need for counsel to protect the Fifth 
Amendment privilege comprehends not merely a right to consult with counsel 
prior to questioning, but also to have counsel present during any questioning 
if the defendant so desires." 384 U. S., at 470 (citation omitted). 
The exception proposed, furthermore, would undermine the advantages flowing 
from Edwards' "clear and unequivocal" character. Respondent concedes that even 
after consultation with counsel, a second request for counsel should reinstate 
the Edwards protection. We are invited by this formulation to adopt a regime 
in which Edwards' protection could pass in and out of existence multiple times 
prior to arraignment, at which point the same protection might reattach by 
virtue of our Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, see Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U. S. 
625 (1986). Vagaries of this sort spread confusion through the justice system 
and lead to a consequent loss of respect for the underlying constitutional 
principle. 
In addition, adopting the rule proposed would leave far from certain the sort 
of consultation required to displace Edwards. Consultation is not a precise 
concept, for it may encompass variations from a telephone call to say that the 
attorney is in route, to a hurried interchange between the attorney and client 
in a detention facility corridor, to a lengthy in person conference in which 
the attorney gives full and adequate advice respecting all matters that might 
be covered in further interrogations. And even with the necessary scope of 
consultation settled, the officials in charge of the case would have to confirm 
the occurrence and, possibly, the extent of consultation to determine whether 
further interrogation is permissible. The necessary inquiries could interfere 
with the attorney client privilege. 
Added to these difficulties in definition and application of the proposed rule 
is our concern over its consequence that the suspect whose counsel is prompt 
would lose the protection of Edwards, while the one whose counsel is dilatory 
would not. There is more than irony to this result. There is a strong 
possibility that it would distort the proper conception of the attorney's duty 
to the client and set us on a course at odds with what ought to be effective 
representation. 
Both waiver of rights and admission of guilt are consistent with the 
affirmation of individual responsibility that is a principle of the criminal 
justice system. It does not detract from this principle, however,* to insist 
that neither admissions nor waivers are effective unless there are both 
particular and systemic assurances that the coercive pressures of custody were 
not the inducing cause. The Edwards rule sets forth a specific standard to 
fulfill these purposes, and we have declined to confine it in other instances. 
See Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U. S. 675 (1988). It would detract from the 
efficacy of the rule to remove its protections based on consultation with 
counsel. 
Edwards does not foreclose finding a waiver of Fifth Amendment protections 
after counsel has been requested, provided the accused has initiated the 
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conversation or discussions with the authorities; but that is not the case 
before us. There can be no doubt that the interrogation in question was 
initiated by the police; it was a formal interview which petitioner was 
compelled to attend. Since petitioner made a specific request for counsel 
before the interview, the policeinitiated interrogation was impermissible. 
Petitioner's statement to Denham was not admissible at trial. 
The judgment is reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings not 
inconsistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
JUSTICE SOUTER took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. 
JUSTICE SCALIA, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE joins, dissenting. 
The Court today establishes an irrebuttable presumption that a criminal 
suspect, after invoking his Miranda right to counsel, can never validly waive 
that right during any policeinitiated encounter, even after the suspect has 
been provided multiple Miranda warnings and has actually consulted his 
attorney. This holding builds on foundations already established in Edwards v. 
Arizona, 451 U. S. 477 (1981), but "the rule of Edwards is our rule, not a 
constitutional command; and it is our obligation to justify its expansion." 
Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U. S. 675, 688 (1988) (KENNEDY, J., dissenting). 
Because I see no justification for applying the Edwards irrebuttable 
presumption when a criminal suspect has actually consulted with his attorney, I 
respectfully dissent. 
I 
Some recapitulation of pertinent facts is in order, given the Court's 
contention that ff[t]he case before us well illustrates the pressures, and 
abuses, that may be concomitants of custody." Ante, at 7. It is undisputed 
that the FBI agents who first interviewed Minnick on Saturday, August 23, 1986, 
advised him of his Miranda rights before any questioning began. Although he 
refused to sign a waiver form, he agreed to talk to the agents, and described 
his escape from prison in Mississippi and the ensuing events. When he came to 
what happened at the trailer, however, Minnick hesitated. The FBI agents then 
reminded him that he did not have to answer questions without a lawyer 
present. Minnick indicated that he would finish his account on Monday, when he 
had a lawyer, and the FBI agents terminated the interview forthwith. 
Minnick was then provided with an attorney, with whom he consulted several 
times over the weekend. As Minnick testified at a subsequent suppression 
hearing: 
,fI talked to [my attorney] two different times and it might have been three 
different times.... He told me that first day that he was my lawyer and that 
he was appointed to me and not to talk to nobody and not tell nobody nothing 
and to not sign no waivers and not sign no extradition papers or sign anything 
and that he was going to get a court order to have any of the police I advised 
him of the FBI talking to me and he advised me not to tell anybody anything 
that he was going to get a court order drawn up to restrict anybody talking to 
me outside of the San Diego Police Department." App. 46-47. 
On Monday morning, Minnick was interviewed by Deputy Sheriff J. C. Denham, who 
had come to San Diego from Mississippi. Before the interview, Denham reminded 
Minnick of his Miranda rights. Minnick again refused to sign a waiver form, 
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but he did talk with Denham, and did not ask for his attorney. As Minnick 
recalled at the hearing, he and Denham 
"went through several different conversations about first, about how everybody 
was back in the county jail and what everybody was doing, had he heard from 
Mama and had he went and talked to Mama and had he seen my brother, Tracy, and 
several different other questions pertaining to such things as that. And, we 
went off into how the escape went down at the county jail...." App. 50. 
Minnick then proceeded to describe his participation in the double murder at 
the trailer. 
Minnick was later extradited and tried for murder in Mississippi. Before 
trial, he moved to suppress the statements he had given the FBI agents and 
Denham in the San Diego jail. The trial court granted the motion with respect 
to the statements made to the FBI agents, but ordered a hearing on the 
admissibility of the statements made to Denham. After receiving testimony from 
both Minnick and Denham, the court concluded that Minnick's confession had 
been "freely and voluntarily given from the evidence beyond a reasonable 
doubt," id., at 25, and allowed Denham to describe Minnick's confession to the 
jury. 
The Court today reverses the trial court's conclusion. It holds that, because 
Minnick had asked for counsel during the interview with the FBI agents, he 
could not as a matter of law validly waive the right to have counsel present 
during the conversation initiated by Denham. That Minnick's original request 
to see an attorney had been honored, that Minnick had consulted with his 
attorney on several occasions, and that the attorney had specifically warned 
Minnick not to speak to the authorities, are irrelevant. That Minnick was 
familiar with the criminal justice system in general or Miranda warnings in 
particular (he had previously been convicted of robbery in Mississippi and 
assault with a deadly weapon in California) is also beside the point. The 
confession must be suppressed, not because it was "compelled," nor even 
because it was obtained from an individual who could realistically be assumed 
to be unaware of his rights, but simply because this Court sees fit to 
prescribe as a "systemic assurancfe]," ante, at 9, that a person in custody 
who has once asked for counsel cannot thereafter be approached by the police 
unless counsel is present. Of course the Constitution's proscription of 
compelled testimony does not remotely authorize this incursion upon state 
practices; and even our recent precedents are not a valid excuse. 
II 
In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), this Court declared that a 
criminal suspect has a right to have counsel present during custodial 
interrogation, as a prophylactic assurance that the "inherently compelling 
pressures,", id. at 467, of such interrogation will not violate the Fifth 
Amendment. But Miranda did not hold that these "inherently compelling 
pressures" precluded a suspect from waiving his right to have counsel 
present. On the contrary, the opinion recognized that a State could establish 
that the suspect "knowingly and intelligently waived ... his right to retained 
or appointed counsel." Id., at 475. For this purpose, the Court expressly 
adopted the "high standar[d] of proof for the waiver of constitutional 
rights," ibid., set forth in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458 (1938). 
The Zerbst waiver standard, and the means of applying it, are familiar: 
Waiver is "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or 
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privilege," id., at 464; and whether such a relinquishment or abandonment has 
occurred depends "in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances 
surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the 
accused," ibid. We have applied the Zerbst approach in many contexts where a 
State bears the burden of showing a waiver of constitutional criminal 
procedural rights. See, e. g. , Faretta v. California, 422 U. S. 806, 835 
(1975) (right to the assistance of counsel at trial); Brookhart v. Janis, 384 
U. S. 1, 4 (1966) (right to confront adverse witnesses); Adams v. United 
States ex rel. McCann, 317 U. S. 269, 275-280 (1942) (right to trial by jury). 
Notwithstanding our acknowledgment that Miranda rights are "not themselves 
rights protected by the Constitution but . . . instead measures to insure that 
the right against compulsory self-incrimination [is] protected," Michigan v. 
Tucker, 417 U. S. 433, 444 (1974), we have adhered to the principle that 
nothing less than the Zerbst standard for the waiver of constitutional r! qhts 
applies to the waiver of Miranda rights. Until Edwards, however, we refrained 
from imposing on the States a higher standard for the waiver of Miranda 
rights. For example, in Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U. S. 96 (1975), we re> l:ed a 
proposed irrebuttable presumption that a criminal suspect, after invokim the 
Miranda right to remain silent, could not validly waive the right during *ny 
subsequent questioning by the police. In North Carolina v. Butler, 441 u. S. 
369 (1979) we rejected a proposed rule that waivers of Miranda rights must be 
deemed involuntary absent an explicit assertion of waiver by the suspect . And 
in Fare v. Michael C , 442 U. S. 707, 723-727 (1979) we declined to hold i:hat 
waivers of Miranda rights by juveniles are per se involuntary. 
Edwards, however, broke with this approach, holding that a defendant's \ /iver 
of his Miranda right to counsel, made in the course of a police initiate^ 
encounter after he had requested counsel but before counsel had been pro\ ided, 
was per se involuntary. The case stands as a solitary exception to our waiver 
jurisprudence. It does, to be sure, have the desirable consequences described 
in today's opinion. In the narrow context in which it applies, it proviso?. 
100% assurance against confessions that are "the result of coercive 
pressures," ante, at 4; it " 'preventfs] police from badgering a defeivw-nt, ' 
' ' ibid, (quoting Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U. S. , (1990)); it 
"conserves judicial resources which would otherwise be expended in making 
difficult determinations of voluntariness," ante, at 4; and it provides 
" ' "clear and unequivocal" guidelines to the law enforcement profession,' 
' ' ibid, (quoting Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U. S., at 682). But so wouih' a. 
rule that simply excludes all confessions by all persons in police custody. 
The value of any prophylactic rule (assuming the authority to adopt a 
prophylactic rule) must be assessed not only on the basis of what is gaSnfcd, 
but also on the basis-of what is lost. In all other contexts we have thought 
the above described consequences of abandoning Zerbst outweighed by " 'i\>e need 
for police questioning as a tool for effective enforcement of criminal .lows,' 
' ' Moran v. Burbine, 475 U. S. 412, 426 (1986). "Admissions of guilt," we 
have said, "are more than merely 'desirable'; they are essential to society's 
compelling interest in finding, convicting, and punishing those who vio'Ji-te the 
law." Ibid, (citation omitted). 
Ill 
In this case, of course, we have not been called upon to reconsider Edwards, 
but simply to determine whether its irrebuttable presumption should continue 
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after a suspect has actually consulted with his attorney. Whatever 
justifications might support Edwards are even less convincing in this context. 
Most of the Court's discussion of Edwards which stresses repeatedly, in 
various formulations, the case's emphasis upon "the 'right to have counsel 
present during custodial interrogation,' ' ' ante, at 5, quoting 451 U. S., at 
482 (emphasis added by the Court) is beside the point. The existence and the 
importance of the Miranda created right "to have counsel present" are 
unquestioned here. What is questioned is why a State should not be given the 
opportunity to prove (under Zerbst) that the right was voluntarily waived by a 
suspect who, after having been read his Miranda rights twice and having 
consulted with counsel at least twice, chose to speak to a police officer (and 
to admit his involvement in two murders) without counsel present. 
Edwards did not assert the principle that no waiver of the Miranda right "to 
have counsel present" is possible. It simply adopted the presumption that no 
waiver is voluntary in certain circumstances, and the issue before us today is 
how broadly those circumstances are to be defined. They should not, in my 
view, extend beyond the circumstances present in Edwards itself where the 
suspect in custody asked to consult an attorney, and was interrogated before 
that attorney had ever been provided. In those circumstances, the Edwards rule 
rests upon an assumption similar to that of Miranda itself: that when a 
suspect in police custody is first questioned he is likely to be ignorant of 
his rights and to feel isolated in a hostile environment. This likelihood is 
thought to justify special protection against unknowing or coerced waiver of 
rights. After a suspect has seen his request for an attorney honored, however, 
and has actually spoken with that attorney, the probabilities change. The 
suspect then knows that he has an advocate on his side, and that the police 
will permit him to consult that advocate. He almost certainly also has a 
heightened awareness (above what the Miranda warning itself will provide) of 
his right to remain silent since at the earliest opportunity "any lawyer worth 
his salt will tell the suspect in no uncertain terms to make no statement to 
the police under any circumstances." Watts v. Indiana, 338 U. S. 49, 59 
(1949) (Opinion of Jackson, J.). 
Under these circumstances, an irrebuttable presumption that any police 
prompted confession is the result of ignorance of rights, or of coercion, has 
no genuine basis in fact. After the first consultation, therefore, the Edwards 
exclusionary rule should cease to apply. Does this mean, as the Court implies, 
that the police will thereafter have license to "badger" the suspect? Only if 
all one means by "badger" is asking, without such insistence or frequency as 
would constitute coercion, whether he would like to reconsider his decision not 
to confess. Nothing in the Constitution (the only basis for our intervention 
here) prohibits such inquiry, which may often produce the desirable result of a 
voluntary confession. If and when post-consultation police inquiry becomes so 
protracted or threatening as to constitute coercion, the Zerbst standard will 
afford the needed protection. 
One should not underestimate the extent to which the Court's expansion of 
Edwards constricts law enforcement. Today's ruling, that the invocation of a 
right to counsel permanently prevents a police initiated waiver, makes it 
largely impossible for the police to urge a prisoner who has initially declined 
to confess to change his mind or indeed, even to ask whether he has changed his 
mind. Many persons in custody will invoke the Miranda right to counsel during 
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the first interrogation, so that the permanent prohibition will attach at 
once. Those who do not do so will almost certainly request or obtain counsel 
at arraignment. We have held that a general request for counsel, after the 
Sixth Amendment right has attached, also triggers the Edwards prohibition of 
policesolicited confessions, see Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U. S. 625 (1986), and 
I presume that the perpetuality of prohibition announced in today's opinion 
applies in that context as well. "Perpetuality" is not too strong a term, 
since, although the Court rejects one logical moment at which the Edwards 
presumption might end, it suggests no alternative. In this case Minnick was 
reapproached by the police three days after he requested counsel, but the 
result would presumably be the same if it had been three months, or three 
years, or even three decades. This perpetual irrebuttable presumption will 
apply, I might add, not merely to interrogations involving the original crime 
but to those involving other subjects as well. See Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U. 
S. 675 (1988). 
Besides repeating the uncontroverted proposition that the suspect has a "right 
to have counsel present," the Court stresses the clarity and simplicity that 
are achieved by today's holding. Clear and simple rules are desirable, but 
only in pursuance of authority that we possess. We are authorized by the Fifth 
Amendment to exclude confessions that are "compelled," which we have 
interpreted to include confessions that the police obtain from a suspect in 
custody without a knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to remain silent. 
Undoubtedly some bright line rules can be adopted to implement that principle, 
narking out the situations in which knowledge or voluntariness cannot possibly 
be established for example, a rule excluding confessions obtained after five 
lours of continuous interrogation. But a rule excluding all confessions that 
follow upon even the slightest police inquiry cannot conceivably be justified 
Dn this basis. It does not rest upon a reasonable prediction that all such 
confessions, or even most such confessions, will be unaccompanied by a knowing 
and voluntary waiver. 
It can be argued that the same is true of the category of confessions excluded 
Dy the Edwards rule itself. I think that is so, but, as I have discussed 
above, the presumption of involuntariness is at least more plausible for that 
category. There is, in any event, a clear and rational line between that 
category and the present one, and I see nothing to be said for expanding upon a 
past mistake. Drawing a distinction between police initiated inquiry before 
consultation with counsel and police initiated inquiry after consultation with 
counsel is assuredly more reasonable than other distinctions Edwards has 
already led us into such as the distinction between police initiated inquiry 
after assertion of the Miranda right to remain silent, and police initiated 
Inquiry after assertion of the Miranda right to counsel, see Kamisar, The 
Sdwards and Bradshaw Cases: The Court Giveth and the Court Taketh Away, in 5 
?he Supreme Court: Trends and Developments 157 (J. Choper, Y. Kamisar, & L. 
Tribe eds. 1984) ("[EJither Mosley was wrongly decided or Edwards was" ); or 
:he distinction between what is needed to prove waiver of the Miranda right to 
lave counsel present and what is needed to prove waiver of rights found in the 
Constitution. 
The rest of the Court's arguments can be answered briefly. The suggestion 
:hat it will either be impossible or ethically impermissible to determine 
zhether a "consultation" between the suspect and his attorney has occurred is 
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